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This paper expands on the view of Modern Greece as a ‘crypto-colonial’ 
space (cf. Herzfeld 2002). It offers an alternative reading of the so-called 
‘Greek-crisis’, using the lens of chronocracy as developed in the introduc-
tion to this volume. An ethnographic engagement with the years of austerity, 
faced by Greek people since 2010, reveals chronocracy to be a colonial tech-
nology with political, moral and epistemic dimensions. Here I argue that 
chronocracy produces an anticipatory nostalgia: namely, a future- oriented 
affective state of longing for what has already been accomplished and at 
once yet to be achieved. I show how anticipatory nostalgia is distributed 
between relational, material and temporal ecologies. The Greek people, I 
argue, sustain a nomadic sense of temporality (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 
2010), manifested in eclectic connections between time fragments that form 
provisional temporal assemblages. These are evident in my ethnography in 
the form of visualities, materialities, discourses and narratives. Nomadic 
temporality emerges as an expression of temporal agency that both resists 
and reifies chronocracy and anticipatory nostalgia.
My present analysis is intellectually indebted to several strands of schol-
arship. The writings of Michael Herzfeld (especially 2002, 2005, 2015, 2016a, 
2016b) on crypto-colonialism, structural nostalgia and European moralism 
are central. However, I also draw on his earlier works on the making of the 
Modern Greek state and the marginalization of the anthropology of Greece 
(1986, 1987), as the impetus for this paper. I build on these works not only to 
support my claim that Greece ought to be analysed as a colonial space but 
also in my attempt to formulate the concept of anticipatory nostalgia and to 
connect it to chronocracy as colonial durability. Post-colonial studies’ liter-
ature and an enormous body of Greek-studies’ scholarship have provided 
substantial analytical and historical evidence on the colonization of the 
Greek past (Bhabha 1984, 1994; Chakrabarty 2000; Hamilakis 2009; Lalaki 
2012; Mignolo 2011; Panourgia 2004; Plantzos 2016; Said 1978; Stewart 2014; 
Stoler 2006, 2016; Tziovas 2014). Interrogating this evidence enables me 
to draw connections between Greek antiquity, European modernity,1 and 
the emergence of the colonized self. Recent anthropological studies of the 
Greek crisis form a framework that allows my ethnography to contextualize 
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the claim that Greek people are orientalized, moralized and pathologized as 
inadequate subjects of modernity (Athanasiou 2014, 2018; Dalakoglou and 
Agelopoulos 2018; Papataxiarhis 2018; Rakopoulos 2019; Thedossopoulos 
2014; Triandadyllidou, Gropas and Kouki 2013). Finally, but most impor-
tantly, anthropological studies of temporality in general and specifically the 
pioneering work of Daniel Knight have provided me with the inspiration 
that has led to the concept of nomadic temporality (Bear 2014, 2016; Bryant 
and Knight 2019; Guyer 2007; Hodges 2008, 2010; Knight 2013, 2014, 2015, 
2016; Knight and Stewart 2016).
I ask that the present work is read not as an apology or as an inter-textual 
strategy of redemption (cf. Argyrou 2002) but as a specifically de-colonial 
anthropological effort which demonstrates how chronocracy can be seen as 
colonial duress (cf. Stoler 2016). On the backdrop of the Greek case, the pa-
per ultimately questions the linear temporality of progress and argues that 
through repetitive cycles of ruination and substitution (cf. Navaro-Yashin 
2009) the time of modernity has cyclical and eschatological properties.
The nomads of time
On a warm, sunny afternoon in late June 2015, I was sitting with several 
of my friends and interlocutors at a café in the picturesque harbour of my 
hometown, Volos, a medium-sized city in Magnesia, Thessaly. The negotia-
tions between the newly elected government of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) 
and the ‘Troika’ (the IMF, the European Commission and the European 
Central Bank) had reached a stalemate. The German chancellor, Angela 
Merkel, the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, 
and the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, were yet again 
threatening Greece with expulsion confirming that the EU was fully pre-
pared for what in recent parlance has come to be called a no-deal scenario. 
According to the local newspaper, folded on the relevant page on the table in 
front of us, Juncker had declared that Grexit would be the only way forward 
if an agreement was not reached by the end of that week. Furthermore, he 
promised humanitarian assistance to alleviate expected shortages in medi-
cines, food and petrol.
George, a public servant in his late forties and a traditional supporter 
of the Greek communist party, was emphatic in his view that he had been 
‘absolutely vindicated’. He reminded the rest of the company how, during 
the years of affluence (commonly referred to in Greece as the pre-crisis era), 
he kept warning his friends that the EU was nothing but a ‘wolf-alliance’ 
(lykosymmahia). “People and politicians were calling the EU our ‘partners’ 
(etairous) and our ‘allies’ (symmahous)”, George said and continued: “Allies! 
What sort of alliance can a lamb forge with a wolf?” “Ah”, Stefania sighed,
you started again your communist parlance. If it was up to you guys 
Greece would have been like Cuba. Get it into your head: Greece 
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belongs to the West. Europe owes us everything. Greece is the essence 
of European civilisation (tou Evropaikou politismou). Even the term 
 ‘Europe’ for Christ’s sake is Greek!
“Ok”, George replied in a caustic manner, “when we run out of petrol and 
medicines as a result of a no-deal bankruptcy (atakti hreokopia), we can give 
the petrol and pharmaceutical companies IOUs with the head of some an-
cient Greek philosopher printed all over them.2 They’ll definitely appreciate 
that!” “I have actually stocked on my mother’s blood-pressure medicines, 
just to be on the safe side”, Stefania remarked and added “do you think we 
should be filling our car reservoirs with petrol?”
Before anyone had the chance to reply, Vicky, a 40-year-old single woman 
who owned her own architectural firm, joined the company. She threw her-
self on a chair and wiping her forehead she almost broke to tears as she 
exclaimed:
dudes, I can’t believe it! (den to pistevo). Half of my close friends are 
blocking me on Facebook because I dared post that the government 
should fold. Some called me a German collaborator (dosilogo – a term 
used for Greeks who collaborated with the Nazis in WWII). Others 
said that they don’t want anything to do with a ‘Euro-remainer’ like 
me (menoumevropaia), and my own cousin commented on my post that 
‘if the Greek fighters of 1821 were like me we would be still under 
 Ottoman rule’. My own cousin won’t talk to me anymore! We have all 
gone crazy! (trellathikame teleios). We are back in the civil war (eimaste 
ston emfylio).
“They are damn right”, Nicholas replied firmly to Vicky, and he added “you 
are either on the side of your own people, or you are with the troika and yes 
this is a civil war. There is no middle ground”. Katerina, a night nurse in her 
thirties, agreed and alluding to a phrase allegedly coined by a Greek inde-
pendence fighter back in 1821, she told Vicky:
The government shouldn’t fold. They can’t fold. We are Greek! We 
shouldn’t grovel. Greeks remain upright, even when they talk to their 
own Gods.3 Greece needs no-one but God. Her God and our ancestors 
stand by us (o Theos is Elladas kai oi progonoi mas). We will fight alone 
and we will make it.
The conversation continued for hours. Through heated and more casual 
statements, my friends agreed and disagreed. They agreed that Greece was 
not where it deserved to be at that moment and that it should somehow return 
to ‘normality’ (na epistrepsoume stin kanonikotita) and to the ‘good days’ 
(stis kales epohes). They disagreed of course –like many other citizens at 
the time – on what constituted ‘normality’ and ‘good days’ and on how this 
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‘return’ was to be accomplished. For Stefania, a now unemployed woman 
who used to work in retail, and a long-standing supporter of the conserv-
ative party, the ‘good days of Greece’ were to be found in its ancient past; 
in the era when “Greeks produced science and art”, in the “glorious days”, 
when the country was “the beacon of civilisation” (o faros tou politismou). 
The Europeans should be reminded, she maintained, that “they can’t throw 
us out” because there “can’t be such a thing as Europe without Greece in it”.
Stefania echoed the sentiments of many Greek people who were aston-
ished by the readiness of the European authorities to oust the country from 
the euro-currency over a financial debt. Scepticism and feelings of suspicion 
towards Europe have been documented in the country as early as the nine-
ties (cf. Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2010a, 2010b), but the complete 
unwillingness of the Europeans to consider the continent’s cultural debt to 
Greece as part of the equation was certainly not expected. Stefania got out 
of her pocket a two-euro coin. “Look at that”, she said to George. “Look 
at it. This is not just money. It is a token of what Greece is to Europe”. The 
coin (on its national side) depicts a scene from a third-century AD mosaic 
found in Sparta showing Europa being abducted by Zeus who has assumed 
the form of a bull. Europa is a figure from Greek mythology after whom 
Europe was named. George shook his head. “Live your myth in Greece”, he 
replied to her sarcastically, alluding to a popular local beer advertisement 
designed for tourists.
Clearly, George did not share Stefania’s vision. For him, ‘the good days’ 
were the days of WWII, when the nation resisted the Nazi occupation and 
later on struggled through a civil war to accomplish the communist revolu-
tion and to establish ‘laokratia’ (rule of the people). A loyal member of the 
communist party, George “did not trust the government of the Radical Left 
(SYRIZA)” and regarded it a “non-authentic expression of the Left”. He 
nevertheless, “almost felt tears rolling down his eyes”, on the night of SYR-
IZA’s electoral victory earlier that year. George recounted to us the moment 
when Costas Lapavitsas, a SOAS professor of Economics and newly elected 
SYRIZA MP, celebrated his party’s success by singing the anthem of EAM 
(National Liberation Front). Sponsored by the Greek Communist Party, 
EAM and its military wing ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army) 
were the main social movements at the heart of Greek resistance against 
German occupation in WWII. In celebration of SYRIZA’s victory, Costas 
 Lapavitsas started singing on camera EAM’s 1946 anthem, a Greek version 
of the Russian Katyusha song:
Three letters illuminate our Greek generation and show us the bright 
path through which we will bring freedom. They are the lights of our 
struggle and the people faithfully follow; young and old, they all cheer, 
long-live EAM. EAM saved us from the famine,4 it will also save us 
from enslavement and has a laocracy (rule of the people) programme. 
Long-live EAM.
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The SYRIZA party supporters gathered around Lapavitsas that night also 
sang the anthem in unison. My own mother, from our living room in  Durham, 
sang alongside them in front of the satellite TV with her fist up, in a stentorian 
voice, surprisingly remembering every single verse of the song despite her 80 
years of age. George also sang the anthem again the day of our meeting, and 
his voice trembled and his hands shook as he recalled the scene. Nicholas and 
Lia, the fervent SYRIZA supporters in our table, joined him, temporarily 
casting aside differences between the communist party and the Radical Left. 
For them too, the good days were the days when “people rose-up against the 
Germans”, and also later, when they “struggled against the US-sponsored 
military junta (Amerikanokiniti hounta)” of 1967–1974.
Nicholas, a civil servant in his mid-forties, and Lia, an English teacher 
in her late thirties, frequently joined the anti-austerity demonstrations of 
2011 and the occupation of Syntagma Square in Athens, having to travel 
some five hours on the bus from Volos. “Those demonstrations were ‘full of 
the souls of 1944’ (gemates apo tis psyches tou 44)”, Lia explained to me. In 
November 1944, after the withdrawal of the German army from Greece, the 
British forces present in the country demanded the immediate disarmament 
of ELAS. The EAM representatives in the transitional government at the 
time were opposed and resigned. EAM organized a massive demonstration 
on December 3, 1944 that turned into a bloodbath, with over 30 people dead 
and approximately 150 wounded, when the police opened fire against civil-
ians. A characteristic photo of that day, which went viral between 2011 and 
2015, shows a row of young women dressed in black, kneeling down on the 
pavement of Syntagma Square, holding a big placate that reads “when the 
people face the danger of tyranny, they choose either their chains or the guns – 
EAM”. “Yes”, Lia stated,
we were [as] once (imastan ena) with the souls of those EAM women and 
men (Eamitisses kai Eamites) when the police threw their tear-gas and 
their stun grenades (chimika kai krotou-lampsis) to the marching crowds 
[in 2011]. We returned to those glorious days of fearless resistance, and 
from there we fought the austerity regime, not only the  Germans and 
their economic occupation but also their local collaborators and their 
cheerleaders.
For Lia and Nicholas, ‘normality’ was about not being tied down by auster-
ity memoranda (mnimonia). They heavily criticized both the conservatives 
and the socialists for “abandoning the country to the hands of her lend-
ers” and for accepting so easily the “transference of European banks’ losses 
onto the shoulders of the Greek people”. Lia had always been a SYRIZA 
supporter, since the party had a mere 3% electoral representation, chiefly 
because of SYRIZA’s social rights’ agenda and the party’s emphasis on is-
sues of gender equality. Nicholas, on the other hand, had been swinging 
between the socialist party (PASOK) and the Radical Left (SYRIZA). He 
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grew up – as he stated – with the legacy of Andreas Papandreou (the founder 
of PASOK and an ex-prime-minister between 1981 and the early nineties). 
Nicholas “had Andreas in his soul (stin psyhi tou)” and he strongly believed 
that “if Andreas was alive, Greece would have never come under the control 
of the Troika”.
Nicholas’s grandfather was an ELAS fighter and his family had suffered 
persecution and discrimination throughout the cold war years, by the “state 
of the Right” (to kratos tis deksias). Andreas Papandreou was elected with a 
stunning 48% majority in 1981, just seven years after the fall of the military 
junta in Greece. Papandreou clearly “laid claim to the ideological heritage 
of EAM” (Karakatsanis 2001: 127; cf. also Veremis 2008: 138). His social-
ist government officially recognized the contribution of the WWII EAM/
ELAS resistance movement and fostered a political culture of opposition 
to the traditional Right that prevailed in Greece until 1974 (cf. also Kos-
tis 2013: 815). Nicholas had somewhat distanced himself from the socialist 
party however, when that “turned the same with the conservatives”, under 
new leadership in the nineties. For him, SYRIZA was “the country’s new 
hope” (cf. Bryant and Knight 2019: 132–133).
Like Nicholas and Lia, Vicky also felt like she was back in December 1944 
when she recounted almost tearfully the breaking down of long-standing 
relationships with friends and family over a Facebook post. Only for Vicky, 
December 1944 marked the beginning of a bitter civil war that cost the lives 
of many and caused “unrepairable damages to families, neighbourhoods, 
and the country as a whole for years to come”. The fate of many Greek peo-
ple (like Nicholas’s family) who had joined the resistance movement against 
the German occupation in WWII through the National Liberation Front 
(EAM) and the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) was sealed in 
the cold war years. They suffered outright persecution, imprisonment and 
exile as political dissidents (cf. Panourgia 2008). Their families, and even 
other ex-EAM/ELAS supporters who ceased to be politically active, found 
it difficult to secure employment, or pursue university degrees, as they were 
considered ‘guilty by association’ and were ‘filed’ by the police as ‘beta’ 
(crypto-communist) citizens.5 Historical research clearly indicates that 
many Greeks who collaborated with the Nazi occupation regime between 
1941 and 1944, survived – physically, politically and economically – after the 
retreat of the German forces and throughout the cold war precisely because 
they made themselves pivotal in the persecution of communists (cf. Chaidia 
2004; Mazower 2004). The Greek military that managed eventually to stage 
the coup of 1967 derived much of its power from the fact that it was seen as 
the ‘guarantor of post-civil war order’ by the US, whose interference in cold 
war Greek politics was blatant and almost institutionalized (cf. Stefanides 
2005: 322–328).
Despite acknowledging the “struggles of the Left” (tous agones tis aris-
teras), the civil war was for Vicky one of the darkest places she could be. 
She found nothing glorious in this era which pre-figured the kind of divisive 
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political tension that led in present time her own cousin to stop talking to 
her. For Vicky, becoming a ‘normal country’ meant going back to the nine-
ties, “the years of development (anaptyksi) and modernization” (eksyhronis-
mos). It meant accepting the country’s debt and the “moral duty” to repay it 
“as every other European country would have done”. Normality for Vicky 
was synonymous with the alignment of Greece with European modernity 
encapsulated in a mixture of “liberal social values, a moderately socialist ap-
proach to welfare and social support and a secular state”. Vicky paid homage 
to the ‘Modern Greek Enlightenment’ (Neoellinikos Diafotismos), an intellec-
tual movement that supported the dissemination (metakenosi) of European 
Enlightenment ideals to the Greek-speaking Orthodox populations of the 
then Ottoman Empire after 1700. This movement paved the way for the 1821 
uprising and the foundation of the Modern Greek state. By liberal social 
values, Vicky meant an emphasis on “the individual and her rights as a citi-
zen”. From within European modernity, Vicky dreamt of a “smaller state”, 
enhanced entrepreneurial opportunities, which she termed as “laissez faire”, 
the eradication of the Greek “clientalist ethos” that supposedly led to corrup-
tion and subsequent fiscal derailment and, above all, the “enforcement of the 
rule of law and the strengthening of institutions”. A basic welfare system was 
important to her, but on the basis of the liberal value of “equal opportuni-
ties” and not necessarily as a system for the redistribution of wealth from the 
richer to the poorer. The desire for a secular state where “logic triumphs over 
superstition” was for Vicky what made her “quintessentially Greek and thus 
European”. “The heirs of Aristotle”, she claimed, “cannot in the 21st century 
continue believing in the miracle of the holy fire and transport the fire from 
Jerusalem to Greece in a special flight”. Indeed, according to the Orthodox 
tradition adhered to by Greeks, and also by other Eastern  Orthodox people, 
the holy fire emanates miraculously from Jesus Christ’s tomb every Easter. 
It is transported from Jerusalem to Athens on the presidential aircraft and 
it is received as a state leader following VVIP protocol. “The Greek peo-
ple”, Vicky maintained, “ought to stop living in the Middle-Ages, and finally 
catch up with the rest of Europe. We invented logic and science. I do not 
understand how we live in this state of self-exile from it”.
Vicky belonged to that segment of the Greek public who found them-
selves a few days before our meeting, on the June 22, in Syntagma Square 
demonstrating this time against the looming Grexit. Their central motto was 
‘we remain in Europe’ (menoume Evropi) and they supported either the con-
servative party (New Democracy) or a particular wing of the socialist party 
(PASOK) known as ‘the modernizers’ (eksynchronistes). The ‘modernizers’, 
chiefly represented by ex-prime-ministers Costas Simitis and George Papan-
dreou were “liberal academics and technocrats, educated in the West” who 
“despised the ‘oriental’ and ‘religious’ aspects of Greek culture, which they 
blamed on Ottoman rule and backward Orthodoxy” (Douzinas 2013: 35).
The seeds of the liberalization of the Greek economy were planted in the 
late eighties, by the conservatives, but the project of ‘modernization’ was 
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launched full-scale in the mid-nineties by the socialist government that fol-
lowed the death of Andreas Papandreou. Its chief aims were privatization, 
the reformation of social security, and the restriction of the influence of the 
church on public and political affairs. As Douzinas notes, “modernization 
was neo-liberalism with a human face”, which attempted to “bring Greece 
closer to its European partners” (2013: 35). Despite the fact that it was pri-
marily engineered by a socialist government, many of its constituent aims 
were also shared by the conservative party that alternated the socialist one 
in power from the mid-nineties until 2009. Most of the central aims of the 
modernization project, however, were never fulfilled under either socialist or 
conservative leadership. The Greek public demonstrated a persistent resist-
ance to the privatization of the public sector, which was thus only partially 
achieved. The attempted introduction of private universities was averted 
by massive student demonstrations and occupations of school buildings 
(katalipseis), while the initiative to reform the social security system caused 
general strikes that brought the entire country to a standstill. Finally, the 
radical separation of church and state caused a different but equally large 
segment of Greek society to take the streets in protest, responding to the call 
of the late archbishop Christodoulos who coined the term ‘people’s gather-
ings’ (laosynaksi) for those particular demonstrations.
Some of the chief goals of modernization were reintroduced to Greece 
by the troika as a series of structural adjustments that accompanied the 
austerity measures. Compliance with these appeared equally central to the 
attainment of fiscal targets in the various negotiations between Greek gov-
ernments and the EU/IMF. Crisis as a state of emergency did not only pro-
duce fiscal austerity but also highlighted the urgency of catching up with 
Europe in all matters political, cultural and institutional (cf. Douzinas 2013; 
Gropas et al., 2013). In this framework, the allegedly ‘enlarged’ and ‘expen-
sive’ public sector was presented as a by-product of ‘clientalism’, which was, 
in turn, explained in terms of a backward ethos of ‘amoral familism’6 and 
Greek ‘collectivism’. Even Douzinas, a professor of Law at Birkbeck and 
later an MP of the SYRIZA government, who – alongside all other SYRIZA 
party members and supporters – defied the theory of ‘Greek exceptionalism’ 
as a cause of the Greek crisis, wrote in 2013:
Modernization was a mechanistic importation of Western models with-
out consideration of anthropological [sic] differences. The habits, con-
ventions and values that support the Greek economy differ from those of 
the West. Identities and social bonds are based on family, friends and the 
community… the attempt to introduce the European model of socialized 
individualism failed… The Greek ethos, with its mild nationalism, secular 
religiosity and familial base, remains one of the strongest in Europe. In 
its corrupted version it promotes neoliberalism; it is also the most powerful 
force for resisting it. It became the first target of austerity measures.
(36–38 emphasis mine)
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The stereotypical narrative of presenting Greek cultural exceptionalism as 
incompatible with Western values and models is, I argue, a deeply oriental-
ist idea (cf. Said 1978). This is not to say that modern Greeks do not have 
their own cultural specificities, similarly to other communities and regions 
in  Europe and beyond. Greek cultural difference however has been persis-
tently presented as an irreconcilable eccentricity that underpins the Greek 
inability to follow ‘European’ political projects. The ensuing ‘urgency’ to 
become European or to catch up with Europe saturates public, political and 
intellectual spheres in Greece since time immemorial (cf. Gropas et al., 
2013).7 It encapsulates the perceived incongruence between the country 
and Europe, which is itself a variation of the theme of discrepancy between 
Modern and Classical Greece.
Classical Greece has operated in the collective imagery of both Greeks 
and other Europeans as an ‘absent presence’ that paradoxically constitutes 
Modern Greece “at once as the collective spiritual ancestor and a political 
pariah in today’s ‘fast-capitalist’ Europe” (Herzfeld 2002: 903, 2005: 18). Por-
trayed as having a collectivist ethos and a perplexing religiosity combined 
with nationalist tendencies, the Greek People are consistently orientalized. 
Their relational patterns are reduced to amoral familism that allegedly 
promotes and sustains networks of patronage, clientalism and corruption. 
Their cultural specificities are caricatured as unmodern beyond redemption. 
Ultimately, the Greek people are produced in local and international imag-
ination as a degenerate mutation of their glorious ancestors, or, in the best 
case scenario, as the exotically unruly anti-heroes of European modernity.
My informants’ narratives need to be understood against this backdrop 
of orientalizing stereotypes. What then emerges are a series of provisional 
timescapes, or ‘chronotopes’, where various knots of narrative become 
temporarily entangled and disentangled (cf. Bakhtin 1981: 84; Bear 2014: 7; 
Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2010a). These chronotopes do not strictly 
belong to the past, the present, or the future. They are poly-temporal en-
actments (cf. Bryant and Knight 2019) that, in effect, produce the past, the 
present and the future. This is not only accomplished through periodization 
and the ordering of history in a before and after manner (cf. Kosellek 1985) 
but also through a collapse of historical temporalities.
Similarly, to many of their fellow citizens, my friends and interlocutors 
inhabit these polytemporal chronotopes in a nomadic fashion. The notion 
of nomadism here serves to indicate the manner in which subjectivities 
emerge as assemblages of events, of discursive, visual, sensorial and ma-
terial fragments of time that form provisional and eclectic connections (cf. 
Deleuze and Guattari 2010; Hamilakis 2017). The classical past and all its 
ruins are scattered around the country. They figure prominently in art and 
everyday contexts, reminding Greek people of their glorious patrimonial 
heritage, while also acting as powerful representations that attract visi-
tors to the country (cf. Basea 2015; Herzfeld 2002: 902). These representa-
tions contrast starkly with visions of the ‘oriental’ Ottoman era and form 
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continuities in hegemonic versions of national history between the classical 
past, Byzantium and a glorified 1821 war of Greek independence (cf.  Lalaki 
2012). They circulate alongside counter-histories told at family dinners, the 
legacy of communist-sponsored resistance to the Nazi occupation and other 
historical instances that make their way into songs, books, stories, urban 
landmarks, material culture, symbols and linguistic idioms. They are tied 
together in various and sometimes unforeseen combinations producing 
patterns of inclusion and exclusion, solidarity and conflict.8 Greek people 
might thus find themselves all in the same space but they remain nomads of 
time, situating a variety of pasts in the present and the futures it contains.
Nomadic temporal subjectivities in Greece emerge as heterogeneous 
ensembles of events, variable intensive affects and durable colonial debris 
(cf. Deleuze and Guattary 2010: 82–83; Stoler 2016). Experiences of eco-
nomic, political and cultural dependence and a persistent, unremitting ori-
entalism that folds itself into the fabric of time produce the Greek subject 
as an exceptionality. Orientalism as colonial sedimentation is first and fore-
most enacted in national history. The history of the nation is aggressively 
promoted through education and an institutionalized emphasis on the coun-
try’s classical past. This emphasis is intimately connected to how European 
powers imagined the Modern Greek state at its inception (cf. Hamilakis 
2009; Herzfeld 1986, 2002; Panourgia 2004; Stewart 2014; Tziovas 2014).
During the years of austerity, Greek people were further orientalized and 
construed as radically different to other Europeans by the hegemonic gaze 
of officials, local and international newspapers, academics, elites and publics 
(cf. Antoniadis 2012; Dalakoglou and Angelopoulos 2018; Knight 2013, 2015; 
 Leontidou 2014; Papataxiarchis 2018; Triandafyllidou, Gropas and Kouki 
2013). The austerity measures and the so-called structural adjustments did 
not have purely fiscal targets and effects. As Douzinas (2013) has argued, they 
also attempted to address the alleged Greek eccentricity in its various man-
ifestations. Patterns of inheritance, for example, are a case in point. As tan-
gible expressions of kinship relations they were disproportionally affected by 
the heavy taxation imposed on property (cf. Knight 2018). The public sector 
was demonized as the embodiment of clientalism, supposedly underpinned 
by Greek familism. The opening of ‘closed’ professions (like taxi driving or 
pharmacy store owning, often passed down from parents to children) became 
a matter of paramount importance to the Troika. Further separation between 
church and state was promoted as a matter of supposedly fiscal obedience 
since, strictu-sensu, priests in Greece belonged to the public sector.
Perhaps, the most blatant example of orientalism as a criminalizing co-
lonial technology of governance is the stereotype of the ‘Greek habit of 
tax-evasion’, a narrative that was circulating widely in 2010–2016 in public 
and official discourses. In September 2011, the senior IMF resident repre-
sentative in Athens, Bob Traa, gave a speech at the Economist conference, 
stating that the fiscal programme imposed by the Troika was not delivering 
the expected results because of the Greek habit of tax-evasion.9 Tax-evasion 
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was presented at the time as a symptom of the Greek lack of trust in the state, 
a sad remnant of the years of Ottoman rule when Greek-speaking, Christian 
Orthodox subjects resisted the Ottoman regime through practicing fiscal dis-
obedience.10 In February of the same year, Traa had publicly reprimanded 
the Greek people (on camera) urging them to ‘cut down on bribery’, using 
the Greek term ‘ fakelaki’ (literally a little envelope, the term is always un-
derstood to mean a bribe). Allegedly, Greeks habitually escaped taxation 
through bribing government officials (just like in the Ottoman period). As 
it transpired later, the EU/IMF programme failed to deliver the expected 
results, not because the so-portrayed post-Ottoman subjects were cheating 
the state but owing to technocratic miscalculations incorporated in its orig-
inal design. Despite overwhelming research-based evidence to the contrary, 
coming from the IMF’s own chief economist Olivier Blanchard, a strategy of 
tight and sudden austerity was adopted, slowing down the economy and de-
teriorating the country’s economic indexes (cf. Blanchard and Leigh 2013). 11
To return to Vicky, Stefania, Nicholas, Lia, George and Katerina whose 
ongoing debates represented those of ever-widening segments of Greek 
society at the time, it was evident that they were not just disagreeing over 
ideology. They were all speaking as different chronopolitical exiles. The ori-
entalized stereotypes evoked to justify austerity measures denied coevalness 
to Greek subjects, thus expelling them from a common present and forcing 
them to inhabit chronotopes of ‘radical alterity’ (cf. Kirtsoglou and Simp-
son this volume, Fabian 1983; Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris 2016, 2018). These 
exiles were not only hegemonically forced upon them by elites, officials and 
the media (as I have tried to explain in the previous paragraphs) but were 
also, in important ways, self-imposed. My interlocutors embodied the con-
tinuous, historic struggle of large parts of Greek society to become what they 
once were. In other words, they became victims of the tyranny of their own 
past, experienced as future potentiality.
Vicky and Stefania – representing the Greek people who remain loyal 
to the project of ‘modernization’ – spoke from the chronotope of ancient 
Greece as a constituent element of European and Modern Greek Enlighten-
ment. Modernity provided them with their vision of ‘normality’, which was 
for them both an already accomplished achievement and simultaneously the 
‘not-yet’ (cf. Bryant and Knight 2019: 197–199; Plantzos 2016). Katerina, the 
32 year old martial arts instructor, who used the words of the 1821 fighter 
to claim that Greeks should ‘stand up’ to EU/IMF, was speaking from the 
chronotope of Modern Greek ethnogenesis. According to this narrative, the 
establishment of the modern state was supposedly achieved by the persona 
of the unruly Greek/Balkan, Christian Orthodox anti-hero who fought al-
legedly ‘alone’, outgunned and outnumbered by the mighty Ottoman Em-
pire and who attracted the admiration of the European Great Powers of 
the time turning them into supportive philhellenes. In reality of course, the 
modern Greek state was established as a crypto-colony, a “buffer zone be-
tween the colonized lands and those as yet untamed… compelled to acquire 
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[its] political independence at the expense of massive economic dependence” 
(Herzfeld 2002: 900). Local elites sought to redeem Greek social atomism 
through presenting it as a variety of ‘European individualism’ (ibid.: 904).
Nicholas, Lia and George, despite the differences between communists 
and the Radical Left, spoke from the chronotope of revolutionary struggle 
as an achievement, and simultaneously as a goal, of many leftists in Greece. 
Their expectations of economic and political ‘liberation’ from the EU/IMF 
officials, who had practically run the country since 2010, would be shat-
tered in less than two months. The Troika managed to force the SYRIZA 
government into what many in Greece saw as a historic compromise. In the 
week that followed the conversation recounted here, capital controls were 
imposed on Greek banks. In spite of this extreme measure, Greek citizens 
voted against the continuation of austerity in a referendum that followed. 
Threatened with an imminent no-deal Grexit, the SYRIZA government 
conceded to the demands of the Troika, and by August, they signed a new 
memorandum that brought more debt, further austerity measures and a new 
package of structural adjustments. The government’s compromise caused a 
split within the party and between SYRIZA voters.
On the morning after the ratification of the new loan agreement in the 
Greek parliament, Lia told me that ‘General Scobie was again in Greece’. 
‘There is no future’, she said, “at least not for us. Another 60 or more years of 
domination lie ahead. We are finished (teleiosame)”. Lia was alluding once 
again to December 1944 when the British forces under Lieutenant General 
Scobie (with the help of the newly created Greek National Guard that in-
corporated many former German collaborators) overpowered EAM/ELAS 
in Athens, forcing the Greek Communist Party to accept an armistice. The 
civil war that followed ended with the defeat of the Left. The subsequent 
establishment of a particular cold-war regime of foreign intervention and 
persecution of communists and their ‘sympathizers’ meant that the country 
“possessed nothing comparable to the social compromise forged elsewhere 
in Europe in the fifties and sixties… no welfare state, no democratic party… 
Wage levels continued to be miserably low and work-place regimes were 
very repressive” (Laskos and Tsakalotos 2013: 24). Lia’s anticipation of the 
‘normality’ of ‘people’s rule’ remained locked in the chronotope of hope as 
refuge from reality; a timescape filled with postponed dreams that accom-
modate what cannot exist in the present or in the foreseeable future.
The nomadic temporalities evident in the arguments of my friends, and 
among Greeks more widely, are in many ways paradoxical. They are burst-
ing with narratives of political causality and accountability inspired by ret-
rocausal readings of the past and the future-as past (cf. Kirtsoglou 2010: 
86–87; Plantzos 2016), but they also carry orientalist visions of the colonized 
self. The latter manifest themselves as perpetual re-turns to a future that 
has been allegedly already accomplished. These re-turns to the future-past 
produce paradoxical feelings of what I have termed anticipatory nostalgia. 
This kind of nostalgia is different from Herzfeld’s structural type (2005). 
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Whereas Herzfeld’s structural nostalgia refers to a ‘longing for the primor-
dial self and for an age beyond the state’ (ibid.: 22), anticipatory nostalgia 
is a future oriented, affective condition. I also argue that it is an explicitly 
colonial predicament. In the following section, I will attempt to substantiate 
my claim and demonstrate the connections between chronocracy, the cen-
tral concept of this volume, nomadic temporality and anticipatory nostalgia 
as a colonial condition.
Chronocracy, nostalgia and nomadic temporality in 
the crypto-colony
The claim that Greece needs to be analysed as a colonial space caught 
between an idealized classical Hellenism and perceptions of what consti-
tutes European modernity is thoroughly supported by previous research 
in the field of Greek studies (cf. De L’ Estoile 2008; Herzfeld 1986, 1987, 
2002;  Lalaki 2012; Leontis 1995; Stewart 2014; also Tziovas 2014). Hellen-
ism (as a political and aesthetic representation of the Greek classical past) 
is a  Western model cultivated in Europe and disseminated through Greek 
speaking elites and philhellenes to the Ottoman world where it became one 
of the ideological platforms of the 1821 war of independence (cf. Stewart 
2014: 10). Classical Greece was an already colonized timescape appropri-
ated by European classicists, architects, historians, artists and politicians. 
It was hegemonically enacted on the newly established Modern Greek state 
in a variety of discursive but also material ways, and it was inscribed onto 
Greek and European urban spaces through the neoclassical architectural 
rhythm (ibid.; see also Gourgouris 1996; Leontis 1995). As Panourgia ex-
plains, neoclassicism (in art, architecture, literature) became an integral 
part of the European project of modernity (2004: 166). The appropriation of 
the classical Greek past reminds us of Mignolo’s argument that “there is no 
modernity without coloniality” (2011: 3) and evidences modernity’s ‘plural 
genealogy and ecology’ (Mitchell 2000: 12–13).
European colonization of ancient Greece as a constituent principle of the 
Enlightenment project (cf. Stewart 2014: 10) posed for Modern Greek people 
a chronopolitical conundrum right from the very first years of the founda-
tion of the new state. Their ‘gaze towards the future’ had to pass through 
“a re-articulation, a reformation and repossession of an antique ideality” 
(Panourgia 2004: 167). As the German Minister of Justice of the first (also 
German) King of Greece stated in 1834, Greek antiquities constituted: the 
“contact point between the actual Greece and the European civilization” 
and therefore had for the Kingdom of Greece “an enormous political sig-
nificance” (ibid.). In order to connect with Greek antiquity and join through 
it ‘European civilisation’, the Minister advised in 1836 that “all the Greeks 
had to do was to mimic the Germans” (Panourgia 2004: 176).
It becomes evident that Modern Greek people were seen right from the 
start as inadequate members of European modernity. Their modernization 
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as progress and as a process of becoming full members of a hegemonic 
Western cultural timescape plays out as a vicious circle. It passes through 
their identification with the past, which in its turn depends upon successful 
incorporation of European modernity through mimicry. This demand for 
identification, or what Bhaba called “to be for an Other” happens through 
an entanglement of presence and absence (1994: 45, 47; cf, also Herzfeld 
2002: 916). The colonial subject can only exist through resemblance either to 
the colonizer or to the orientalist stereotypes of her that emerge as a result 
of the colonial situation (cf. Bhaba 1994: 48; 1984).
The multiple orientalist visions of the self form predictable and unpre-
dictable connections with various fragments of time – as I have argued – in 
a nomadic fashion. A nomadic sense of temporality destabilizes the process 
of cultural signification and constitutes national culture as a series of provi-
sional dialectics of diverse temporal events (Bhaba 1994: 216). The appropri-
ation of classical Greece by right-wing and fascist regimes in the twentieth 
century for instance (cf. Hamilakis 2002, 2009; Tziovas 2014) causes this 
aspect of the past to be downplayed, frowned upon or ridiculed as ‘kitsch’ 
by communists and leftists like George, Nicholas and Lia. Nevertheless, the 
ancient Greek past may come to be defended on a different occasion by the 
same actors who usually refuse to identify with it, as it comes to form con-
ditional entanglements with other events, affects and materialities in a new 
temporal assemblage.
To substantiate my claim, I will offer the example of George; my com-
munist friend who made fun of Stefania by remarking ‘live your myth in 
Greece’ when she was showing him the euro-coin’s depiction of the Greek 
classical past as a proof of the unbreakable connection between Greece 
and Europe. Despite being entirely aware of the relationship  between 
Hellenism and right-wing discourses, George was among the first to join 
demonstrations against the treaty signed between Greece and North 
Macedonia in 2018 ending decades of dispute over the name of the neigh-
bouring country. Given his communist loyalties, I asked him why he was 
joining the protests. I reminded him that the Greek communist party was 
the first political alliance in the history of Greece to recognize the right 
of Macedonians to self-identification, towards the end of the civil war in 
1949. “This has nothing to do with self-identification”, George replied to 
me and explained:
This is a mixture of FYROM (Former Yugoslavic Republic of 
 Macedonia) extreme nationalism and NATO’s imperialist programme 
to control the Balkans. The fact that I loathe (sihainomai) Greek 
 nationalists does not mean that I applaud the FYROM ones. Do you 
know that FYROM is full of kitsch cast statues of Alexander the Great 
whom these people are taught to claim as their ancestor? This is all 
about what NATO wants to establish in the area: a series of satellite 
states existing for its own purposes.
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Since 2017 (when Greek negotiations with North Macedonia were offi-
cially announced), George incorporated the motto ‘Macedonia is Greek’ 
(i  Makedonia einai Elliniki) into his social media profile, in a sticker on his 
car and on his keyring. He was not the only non-right wing to feel that way. 
Mikis Theodorakis, composer of Zorba’s Dance and of many famous songs, 
and an unconventional leftist who eventually entered the Greek national 
parliament as a conservative, spoke publicly in one of the major demonstra-
tions against the treaty, accusing the government of the Radical Left that 
signed it of ‘leftist fascism’ (aristerostrofo fasismo).
The continuous reworking of different time fragments into diverse tem-
poral assemblages in a nomadic fashion produces hybrid understandings 
of Hellenism and Greekness (cf. Hamilakis 2009). It also allows the colo-
nial gaze to fold and refold into cultural and political life to a point that 
separating the two becomes impossible. From within these different under-
standings of Hellenism, modern Greeks suffer from a distinctive version 
of chronocracy: that is, the discursive and practical ways in which temporal 
regimes are used in order to deny coevalness and thereby create deeply asym-
metrical relationships of exclusion and domination (Kirtsoglou and Simpson 
this volume). As crypto-colonized subjects of chronocracy, Greek people 
have been, as Herzfeld argues, doubly victimized. They “suffer the political 
and economic effects of colonialism itself, but they are excluded materially 
and epistemologically” from processes of formal recognition of their situa-
tion (Herzfeld 2002: 919–920).
Being at once products and creators of a European modernity to which 
they are not fully accepted causes paradoxical feelings of anticipatory nos-
talgia for a future-past. Nostalgia has been discussed in anthropology in 
relation to post-Soviet spaces (cf. Boyer 2006, 2012; Todorova and Gille 
2012). More widely, the concept has been used to address methodological 
issues (Berliner 2015), loss and restoration (Boym 2001), moral critique and 
social change (Parla 2009) and subaltern memory (Atia and Davies 2010). 
Angé and Berliner’s edited collection on Anthropology and Nostalgia goes 
beyond Eastern Europe to bring ethnographies of different regions of the 
world into a fruitful discussion of nostalgia and its relationship to the so-
cial production of history, materialities, past, present and future tempo-
ralities (2015).
The kind of nostalgia I refer to here is an explicitly colonial condition. 
It can be understood as a future-oriented, affective state of collapsed hope 
(cf. Bryant 2015) and postponed perfection. It is embedded not only into 
the minds and hearts of my Greek interlocutors but also in the minutiae of 
their material environments, from where it is ‘discharged upon them’ as an 
experience of ‘ruination’ (cf. Navaro-Yashin 2009: 5). Anticipatory nostal-
gia expresses an affective dimension of subjectivity that emerges out of the 
continuous struggle of Greek people to negotiate at once their glorious past 
as a vested right and their continuously postponed future as a reflection of 
this past (cf. Plantzos 2016).
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Anticipatory nostalgia is a product of chronocracy enacted in everyday 
experience and in relations to material, visual and discursive environments 
(cf. Basea 2015; Plantzos 2016). In terms of the classical past, gazing at an 
ancient site nearby, studying your history lesson for tomorrow, handling a 
euro-coin, watching an actor cry “this is Sparta” in a blockbuster movie, 
force people to re-turn to an idiosyncratic affective state of lack and ac-
complishment. This is true for all hybrid versions of Hellenism: the simplis-
tic one that portrays Hellenism as the glorious ideal and the more complex 
‘modern’ articulation that emphasizes reason and secularism. Alternative 
historical motifs are equally evocative of anticipatory nostalgia. The vision 
of the unruly Balkan, Christian Orthodox anti-hero, or the subject of fre-
quently romanticized, twentieth century revolutionary resistance may seem 
to be attractive counter-chronocratic, de-colonial alternatives. In reality, 
however, they are similarly unattainable positionalities since they also enact 
states of freedom achieved and at the same time yet to happen.
As an affective state, nostalgia for what has been already accomplished 
and at once for the anticipated condition of being liberated from chrono-
cratic domination causes hands to shake, voices to tremble, tears to roll 
down the eyes, deep feelings of injustice, pride and inadequacy. It fills the 
future with the past and the present with future orientations (cf. Bryant and 
Knight 2019). It encourages understandings of the self as always already 
defiant and at once defeated (cf. Herzfeld 1987). Anticipatory nostalgia is 
embedded into and emitted from visual, discursive and material ecologies 
(cf. Navaro-Yashin 2009). It saturates ‘the street’ (to dromo, to pezodromio) 
as the paramount landscape of resistance (cf. Dalakoglou 2012, 2018) and 
the Syntagma Square where the Greek anti-austerity indignation movement 
developed in 2011 in the shadow of past struggles, like the big EAM demon-
stration of 1944.
The Greek ‘crisis’ as a state of emergency and ‘urgency’ to catch-up with 
European, capitalist modernity accentuated anticipatory nostalgia, as it was 
nothing more than yet another variation of chronocracy as a colonial politi-
cal technology. Much like in the 1836 newly established Kingdom of Greece, 
‘all the Greeks had to do’ since 2010 was ‘to mimic the Germans’. This 
time the advice was not offered by the 1836 Minister of Greece’s  German 
King but by the likes of the 2013 Germany’s Minister of Finance, Wolfgang 
Schäuble, the Dutch President of the Eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, and 
the French chairwoman of the IMF, Christine Lagarde. It was echoed by 
local elites and politicians who insisted that Greece had to become a normal 
country by returning to the path of modernization, progress and development.
In a detailed analysis of 2011–2016 official discourses on the Greek crisis, 
Stavrakakis and Galanopoulos (2019) reveal that ‘normality’ was presented 
in the official narratives of conservative and socialist governments as a se-
ries of ‘turns’ and ‘re-turns’ to the future of European capitalist modernity. 
The medium of identification was this time, not the classical past, but the 
austerity measures. Austerity would allegedly help the country to return to 
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the normality of the markets and eventually, through its full participation 
in the capitalist system, to become reinstated in the EU as an equal partner. 
This is what a number of EU officials, Greek politicians and journalists 
maintained. Speaking at the Conference of the Greek Union of Entrepre-
neurs in October 2014, the then leader of the socialist party that participated 
in the Greek coalition government claimed that “the return to normality is 
not a return to the past, but a return to the future” (my emphasis, Stavrakakis 
and Galanopoulos 2019: 181). Achieving normality through an austerity 
programme that would help Greeks to successfully imitate their European 
counterparts, rendered – yet again – the country’s present “something that 
is absent and temporally deferred… a representation of time that is always 
elsewhere, a repetition” (Bhaba 1994: 51).
Chronocracy, however, did not just manifest in Greece as a colonial 
technology of governance. It was also enacted as phroneses (cf. Bear 2016; 
 Kirtsoglou and Simpson this volume), that is, in the form of a series of moral 
statements about the Greeks as degenerate mutations of the ideal modern 
European citizen (cf. Herzfeld 2016a, 2016b; Knight 2013). Articulated by 
local and international officials and the media, these statements presented 
Greeks as Ottoman relics who would not hesitate to cheat the state or the 
EU for personal gain. Through an emphasis on Greek anachronism and 
dubious moral standards the crisis was not presented simply as an economic 
or a fiscal event but as a proof of the Greek people’s moral and cultural lag 
(cf. Douzinas 2011; Gkintidis 2018; Rakopoulos 2019). As Graeber (2011) 
has argued, debt is not actually an economic but a moral statement (cf. also 
Athanasiou 2014: 7; Goddard 2019; Narotzky 2016; Sabaté 2016). As such, 
the way the country’s debt was handled constitutes a particular facet of 
chronocracy that served to deny the Greek people moral (as well as cultural 
and historical) coevalness with the rest of Europe.
Epistemic chronocracy – as a form of denying coevalness through regimes 
of expert knowledge – was also a feature of political, journalistic, academic 
and technocratic discourses of the crisis. Austerity was a regime primar-
ily designed to transfer the financial risk of major European banks onto 
the shoulders of Greek and other European citizens.12 Nevertheless, it was 
presented and defended as an expert remedy to a country’s lagging mod-
ernization. During the so-called ‘crisis’, Greek people’s fates, their future 
‘progress’ and their future as progress were decided in closed  Eurogroup 
meetings and also in Hilton, a landmark hotel in Athens where the Troika 
met with local government officials. These critical decision-making events 
at the margins of the state (cf. Das 1995; Knight and Stewart 2016: 10) cre-
ated asymmetrical timelines between decision-makers and those forced to 
bear the consequences of other people’s decisions (cf. Kirtsoglou 2010). In 
official and public discourses that medicalized and pathologized the ‘Greek 
condition’, forms of expert knowledge were employed as diagnostic tools 
and simultaneously as therapies of the country’s assumed pathologies 
(cf. Stavrakakis and Galanopoulos 2019; Stoler 2006: 410). In one of my visits 
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to Athens in 2013, I took a taxi to a meeting I had near the Hilton hotel. 
Upon hearing where I wanted to go, the taxi driver remarked: “Ah, you want 
to go to the hospital!” “No the Hilton hotel”, I replied failing to tune in to 
his subtle irony. “I know”, he replied
at the hospital. This is where Greece, the Big Patient as they call it now 
(o megalos astehnis) is supposedly lying13. All the top doctors have come 
from Europe (apo tas Evropas) and confer all the time about what kind 
of chemotherapy they will give her in order to cure us from anachronism 
(apo tin anachronistikota). But you know what happens when you get a 
big dosage of such medicines. You die and that’s the end of it (pethaineis 
kai teleionei to zitima).
The Greek colonial condition has been continuously rearticulated in diverse – 
and conflicting – narratives of progress as the ‘normal’ expected future ori-
entation. As a collective ideal, progress may appear as being oriented to-
wards a specific end but is in fact a cyclical aporia, as it heavily depends on 
defeating that which came before (Navaro-Yashin 2009: 7). In terms of how 
modernity approaches progress in scientific knowledge, revolutions demand 
that past approaches become defeated and ruinated (ibid.; Kuhn 1970). In 
turn, progress as modernity’s collective societal goal commands that the 
past is symbolically destroyed as it is conquered, overcome and transformed 
into a place of no-return, which can be only preserved as singularized his-
tory (cf. Bhabha 1994: 56; Chakrabarty 2000; Koselleck 1985; Lyotard 1985). 
Progress as a quintessential principle of modernity rests on a strict ordering 
of time in temporalities of before and after and celebrates change, devel-
opment and substitution of the old and parochial in favour of the new and 
better. Since this process is both continuous and relentless, its telos remains 
a slippery and precarious feature. The moment we achieve progress, the goal 
of future progress reappears in front of us. There is a saying in Greek that 
captures this aporia well: “the better is the enemy of good” (o ehthros tou 
kalou einai to kalytero).
Progress, it would seem, can only exist in a linear time frame so that we can 
prove the changes by putting them behind us and meaningfully strive towards 
future change. Through exponential repetition of this process however, linear 
time acquires cyclical properties. The repetitive cycle of substituting the new 
best with an even newer better-best renders the process of progress entirely 
predictable. As such, modernity’s belief in progress can be seen as an escha-
tological condition (cf. Guyer 2007). Just as members of various Christian de-
nominations feel they know the direction of time towards a salvationist end, 
the subject of modernity feels she knows time’s infinite trajectory.
Because progress cannot but be at once achieved-and-yet-to-be- 
accomplished, it is actually a state that fills us all (not just the Greeks) with 
anticipatory nostalgia. We live in a constant condition of being nostalgic 
of our futures, and we can be nostalgic of them because we allegedly know 
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already what they will look like: better than our pasts and presents. Our 
eschatological belief in progress is our common colonial condition at the 
heart of both neoliberal capitalism and the revolutionary visions of resist-
ance to it. Both frameworks are ultimately products of modernity, and as 
such, they are oriented towards a future potentiality envisaged as a state 
hitherto ‘better’ than the present.
I believe that my Greek informants strive to resist the aporia of progress 
through what I have called nomadic temporality. The polytemporal char-
acter of Greek political and historical experience has been documented 
chiefly in the work of Daniel Knight (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) and in his col-
laborations with Stewart (2016) and Bryant (2019). The renewed interest 
in Southern  Europe and austerity made temporality a fruitful entry point 
of analysis. For example, in relation to memory and resistance (Narotzky 
2016), forgetting and suppressed memories (Pipyrou 2016) and trauma 
and affect (Alexandrakis 2016; Apostolidou 2018). These works comple-
mented anthropological discussions of historicity (Stewart 2016), the near 
future (Guyer 2007), debt and fiscal disobedience (Graeber 2011; Han 2004; 
 Roitman 2005), hope (Miyazaki 2004, 2006), speed cultures of modernity 
(Virilio 2005), the study of time through labour (Bear 2014) and the concept 
of time as a technique (Bear 2016). What does yet another take on temporal-
ity have to offer to an already established body of relevant literature? What 
does the term ‘nomadic’ bring to the debate?
My inspiration here comes from Deleuze and Guattari’s work on Nomadol-
ogy (2010). In this work they set out to convey the anti-genealogical, impulsive 
and volatile character of nomadic existence. Here, I extend their thinking by 
describing a nomadic sense of temporality and one which could potentially 
be perceived as a de-colonial strategy of resistance to the predictable, ordered 
cyclicality of modernity as progress. In this sense, I prefer to view the way in 
which my informants blend temporalities superimposing one upon the other 
and folding them into each other, as an anti-chronocratic act of rejecting mo-
dernity’s impulse to order time through the notion of progress.
At each turn of history, Greek temporal subjectivities appear to be com-
posed of collapsed fragments of time. As the colonial condition compels 
them to move seemingly ‘ahead’, my informants instinctively apprehend 
that linearity is nothing more than a short-term illusion; a small fragment 
of a bigger curve. When one walks on a straight line, one knows that this is 
actually part of an elliptic earth and if one keeps walking, one will eventu-
ally reach the same point. Similarly, nomadic temporalities destabilize the 
linear illusion of modernity-as-progress and reveal its cyclical properties. 
Greek temporalities are nomadic, I argue, because they resemble complex, 
curvy configurations with manifold, unbounded interconnections between 
different time fragments that produce potentially infinite temporal assem-
blages as they expand in all directions.14 The anti-genealogical, impulsive 
and volatile character of nomadic temporal existence is revealed in the way 
various time fragments are being recursively and retrocausally assembled 
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and re-assembled in provisional chronotopes. This kind of temporal diso-
bedience, causes historical events to be selectively re-lived in the present (cf. 
Knight 2015), connecting nominal notions of past, present and future with 
the local and the global in instances of analogical thinking (cf. Sutton 1998).
Nomadic thinking is in a sense the inverted image of anticipatory nostal-
gia. Conversely to anticipatory nostalgia that is ultimately a future-oriented 
event, nomadic temporality is eclectic and sometimes unpredictable. It cre-
ates all sorts of unexpected connections between events that maintain “the 
possibility of springing up at any point” (Deleuze and Guattari 2010: 5). Its 
consistency is that of a ‘fuzzy aggregate’ plural, affective and distributed be-
tween persons and things (ibid.: 44, 82–83). Since nomadic temporality is a 
kind of anti-progress temporal agency, it is also non-teleological. It is not 
organized around temporal trajectories (cf. Bryant and Knight 2019: 17–18). 
It enacts a multi-accentuated sense of time as contingency and promotes the 
creation of serendipitous entanglements between experience, memory, infer-
ence, affect, visuality and materiality. Just as nomadic temporality remains 
stubbornly anti-progressive and non-directional, however, it also reifies colo-
nial duress (cf. Stoler 2016). Colonial vestiges are inscribed and re-inscribed 
onto the manifold temporal surfaces through a process of successive folding 
and re-folding of chronocracy into the fabric of time. The manner in which 
chronocracy enters and inhabits nomadic temporality poses a limit to the sub-
ject’s temporal agency and renders it an assemblage of thoughts, discourses 
and practices that both resist and reify the relevance of the colonial gaze.
Conclusion: a long-standing grief – kaimos
but Greece, as it is known, never dies and as it has been foretold one day it 
will rise again from the dead.15
Different scholars, including myself, have documented through the years 
Greek feelings of injustice over the unequal relations of power promoted by 
the failed project of modernity (Herzfeld 2002, 2016a, b; Kirtsoglou 2006, 
2010; Sutton 1998; Theodossopoulos and Kirtsoglou 2010a, 2010b).16 Up 
until 2010, my interlocutors used to tell me that they were the asymmet-
rical allies of Europe and of the US (cf. Kirtsoglou and Theodossopolos 
2010b). They provided me with complex narratives of political aetiology, as 
they elaborated on their relationship with an imaginary West, of which they 
felt ‘simultaneously an image, a creation, an appendix, an ally and an en-
emy’ (Kirtsoglou 2006: 64). The open secret of Greek political, cultural and 
economic dependence (cf. Herzfeld 2015) was locally articulated after 2010 
as a case of straightforward colonial domination. The term ‘debt-colony’ 
(apoikia hreous) was one of the most frequent expressions my interlocutors 
employed to describe their experiences in the years of austerity. They of-
fered it to me in supermarket queues and later on at the long queues in front 
of ATMs after the imposition of capital controls in the summer of 2015. 
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They used it to express their anticipatory nostalgia of the times (always past 
and yet to come) when Greece was/will be seen as a sovereign country and 
an equal member of Europe and the world. They employed it to talk about 
freedom, democracy and dignity, the values they have fought/fight/will fight 
for against an ‘imperialist capitalism’ that sought to operationalize their 
lives and to turn them into ‘slaves for the world’s few’.
The feeling of being colonized – taken over as a cultural and political 
 subject – has deep historical roots in Greece. What was termed as the 
‘Greek crisis’ and the way this was handled institutionally, in public and 
in media discourses, has nothing ‘new’ to offer to our understanding of the 
Greek historical and political condition. It cannot be considered as a kind of 
rupture in time or as a bounded event. It is merely another facet of Greece’s 
chronocratic relationship with an imaginary European modernity and its 
institutional and informal propagations. As Herzfeld argued, the ‘EU is 
a successor to Great Power imperialism’ (2016a: 11). Modern Greece has 
been unofficially colonized culturally, politically and economically since 
the inception of the Modern Greek state. In fact, it may well owe its very 
existence as a state to the fact that classical Greece had been already appro-
priated as an integral part of European modernity (cf. Beaton 2014; Tziovas 
2014). The manner in which Greek people were chronocratically oriental-
ized, moralized and pathologized since 2010 is just another manifestation of 
their chronic colonial condition. The stereotypes of profligate tax-evading 
citizens of an unmodern state that needed to finally become European or 
else exit the EU were nothing but variations upon the same crypto-colonial 
themes played out for nearly 200 years.
Through neoclassicism, Hellenism or neoliberalism, the Greek people 
have been diachronically admonished to ‘catch-up’ as a matter of urgency. 
Indigenous resistance to the project of (capitalist) modernity has been rou-
tinely exoticized, romanticized, and pathologized (cf. Theodossopoulos 
2014). From within their colonial condition, my informants are ridden with 
a chronic, anticipatory nostalgia of the future-past (cf. Kirtsoglou 2010: 
86–87; Plantzos 2016). Modernization-as-progress is experienced as an ori-
entalizing project of ‘ruination’ and destruction (cf. Navaro-Yashin 2009) 
of the Modern Greek cultural eccentricities: their failure to become indi-
viduals (cf. Stewart 2014); their collectivist and familist ethos (cf. Douzinas 
2013); their ‘mild’ – and not so mild – nationalism (ibid.; Kitromilides 1989), 
their superstitious religiosity that contravenes Enlightenment ideals of rea-
son and logic (cf. Argyrou 2002: 60–61, 100), their ‘archaic’ notions of retrib-
utive justice (cf. Loizos 1988), their ‘conspiratorial’ irrationalism (cf. Brown 
and Theodossopoulos 2003; Sutton 2003) and their Ottoman-inspired clien-
talist predisposition were all deemed unfit for the modern, contractarian, 
fast-capitalist Europe (cf. Herzfeld 2002, 2016a, 2016b; Kirtsoglou 2006). 
All in all, Greek people have been continuously urged to re-turn where they 
once were or else stop laying claim to the classical past as the holy grail of 
modernity (cf. Tziovas 2014: 16).
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What I have tried to analyse in this paper (namely Greece’s colonial 
condition, its relationship to the chronocratic properties of modernity-as- 
progress and the production of anticipatory nostalgia) is tied to the concept 
of nomadic temporalities. My Greek informants seem to be refusing to view 
the past as history to be preserved. For them, the past remains alive (cf. De 
L’ Estoile 2008; Knight 2015). They also refrain from defeating old frame-
works and stubbornly bring all kinds of temporalities onto complex, man-
ifold configurations where everything is potentially related to everything 
else. Their nomadic sense of temporality both resists and reifies anticipatory 
nostalgia. The array and unpredictability of connections between different 
time fragments resist the ordering of time and constitute temporality an 
open ‘expansive ecology’ (cf. Widger and Wickramasinghe this volume). The 
folding and refolding of temporalities into different temporal assemblages, 
however, reproduces orientalist images of the self and perpetuates antici-
patory nostalgia as the affective structure of the Greek colonial condition. 
Caught in the net of this impossibility, Greece, or Ellada, as my informants 
prefer to call it, is an entity similar to Schrödinger’s cat: it at once ‘rises from 
the dead and never dies’. As Christina, one of my dearest Greek friends fre-
quently states, “every problem has a solution. A problem with no solution is not 
a problem. It is a long-standing grief (kaimos). Ellada my dear is a kaimos”.
Notes
 1 The use of the term ‘modernity’ here does not denote a homogenous temporal, 
political or historical entity. My analysis demonstrates the ‘plural genealogy and 
ecology of modernity’, evident in its relation to the appropriation of the classical 
Greek past (Mitchell 2000: 12–13).
 2 IOU – an abbreviation of the term I Owe You – is a kind of informal promissory 
note which acknowledges debt but does not specify the terms and time of repay-
ment. The term IOU was introduced to public discourse by the then minister 
of finance Yanis Varoufakis who saw it as tool in a possible parallel electronic 
payments system, in case Greece was suddenly expelled from the Eurozone. See 
Yanis Varoufakis Adults in the Room, p. 287, section mea maxima culpa.
 3 Eimaste Ellines. Den proskyname. Emeis kai stous Theous milame orthioi.
 4 This verse of the song refers to the soup kitchens organised by EAM during the 
Great Famine of 1941–1943 German occupation. For how the Great Famine pic-
tured in Greek experiences of the crisis see Knight (2013, 2015). For EAM’s soup 
kitchens see Margaret Poulos (2014), esp. Section 4.2.
 5 ‘Beta’ here is an official characterization (not to be confused with ‘second class 
citizen’). For more on this subject see Clogg (1979: 168; Samatas 1986: 35).
 6 The term was coined by Banfield in his 1958 study of a Southern Italian village. 
The concept of amoral familism sought to provide an explanation of why certain 
societies fail to progress. It argued that backward societies were not investing 
their energies towards the public good and prioritized present orientation over 
future planning. Banfield’s proposition was warmly received and used for sev-
eral years in relevant sociological literature (cf. Ferragina 2009).
 7 For further historical contextualization, see Diamantouros (1994) on Greek cul-
tural dualism, pointedly discussed in relation to the crisis by Triandafyllidou, 
Gropas and Kouki (2013).
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 8 For example Knight’s (2015) informants experience austerity through the Otto-
man past and the 1941 Great Famine, rather than focussing on the civil war era.
 9 https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp091911.
 10 See Antoniades (2012) http://www.lse.ac.uk/Hellenic-Observatory/Assets/ 
Documents/Research/Research-Projects/Greek-Econ-Crisis-in-the-International-
Pressen.pdf; http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1958721,00.html.
 11 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jun/05/imf-underestimated- 
damage-austerity-would-do-to-greece. For an accessible explanation of what be-
came known as the Blanchard-Leigh fiscal multiplier, one of the chief faults in the 
EU-/IMF design of the fiscal austerity programme see https://briefingsforbrexit.
com/the-imf-abetted-the-european-unions-subversion-of-greek- democracy/ 
and Jonathan Porte’s (National Institute of Economic and Social Research) 
comment https://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/no-debate-please-were-europeans.
 12 In 2010 the country’s fiscal derailment meant that it could potentially default 
on its payments to international investors in National Bonds. European banks 
(particularly German and French) were exposed to this risk. The remedy of-
fered by the EU and the IMF was a mixture of heavy, horizontal taxation (to 
address quickly the country’s fiscal derailment) and bigger loans presented as 
‘bail-outs’. Disregarding the evidence offered by the IMF’s chief economist 
 Olivier Blanchard, the heavy austerity measures imposed significantly slowed 
the Greek economy, causing the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 
plummet. As a result, the Greek external debt as percentage of its GDP soared. 
The main reason that Blanchard’s advice was overlooked was in fact the urgency 
to remedy the exposure of the European Banking system to Greek National 
Bonds. The austerity regime needs thus to be seen as a financial tool primar-
ily geared towards saving the European banking system rather than ‘reviving’ 
or ‘sorting out’ the Greek economy. Its externally facing goal (safeguarding 
 European banks) was achieved, but its internal goal (strengthening the Greek 
economy) failed miserably. The blame for this failure was consistently cast upon 
the Greek people through a series of orientalising, culturalist discourses about 
their  alleged resistance to modernisation. 
 13 This metaphor used extensively during the crisis by European and local politi-
cians and officials has its own interesting multitemporal character. The image 
of Greece as a ‘patient’, covered head to toe in a plaster cast, has been proposed 
by the dictator Papadopoulos to justify the junta’s intervention in Greek politics 
(see Van Dyck 1998: 16).
 14 For mathematically inclined readers, what I am referring to here is a sense of 
temporality akin to a Riemann’s surface. The term nomadic is indexical to the 
holomorphic function of temporality.
 15 Ma i Ellada os gnoston, pote tis den pethainei, ki opos ehei eipothei, kapoia stigmi 
th’ anastithei.
 16 For an account of why modernity was indeed a failed project, see Kirtsoglou 
(2006, 2010, 2014); Kirtsoglou and Thedossopoulos (2010, 2013); Christou (2018).
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